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dedicated judges surely make occasional mistakes, but the public expects judges to avoid making system-

atic errors that favor particular
parties or writing opinions that em-

some circumstances causes people to
draw systematically inaccurate inferences-in other words, these heuristics can create cognitive illusions of

judgment.
Just as certain patterns of visual
stimuli can fool people's eyesight,
leading them to see images that are
CHRIS GUTHRIE is a professor at
not really present, certain fact patVanderbilt University Law School.
terns can fool people's judgment,
leading them to believe things that
JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI is a professor
at Cornell Law School.
are not really true. The systematic
nature of the errors that these illuANDREW J. WISTRICH is a United States
sions produce can be analogized to
Magistrate Judge, United States District
the sort of errors that an expert
Court, Central District of California.
marksman makes if his rifle sight is
out of alignment: his shots land in a
bed these mistakes into the substan- tight cluster, but away from the
tive law.
bullseye.
Psychological research on human
Decades of research indicate that
judgment, however, suggests that this cognitive illusions affect the way juexpectation might be unrealistic. ries decide cases.2 But are judges any
This research indicates that people better? On the one hand, judges are
44
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illusions. On the other hand, research on judgment and choice suggests that cognitive illusions plague
many professionals, including doctors, real-estate appraisers, engineers, accountants, options traders,
military leaders, psychologists, and
even lawyers.' Systematic, controlled
studies of judicial decision making

This article is abstracted from Guthrie,
Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the JudicialMind, 86
CORNrELL L. REv. 777 (2001). The views expressed
are solely those of the authors, and not of the
Federal Judicial Center, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, or the Judicial
Conference of the United States.
1. See Tversky and Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124
(1974).
2. See MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury
Decision Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046 (1989).
3. See generally, Pious, THE PSYCHOLOGY Or JUDcMENT AND DECISION MAKING 258 (1993) (observing

that "several studies have found that experts display either roughly the same biases as college students or the same biases at somewhat reduced
levels").

are rare, 4 and whetherjudges are susceptible to these cognitive illusions

remains an open empirical question.
To begin to answer this question, we
conducted an empirical study to determine whether five common cognitive
-I

4. A few studies have demonstrated the effects
of various cognitive illusions in judges: Anderson,
et. al., Evaluation ofAuditorDecisions:HindsightBias
Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
711, 726-727 (1993) (hindsight bias); Eisenberg,
Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy
Cases, 72 WASH U. L. Q. 979 (1994) (egocentric biases); Viscusi, How doJudges Think About Risk? 1 Am.
L. & ECON. REv. 26 (1999) (over-estimation of
small risks, hindsight bias, and ambiguity aversion); Robbenolt, PunitiveDamage DecisionMaking:
The Decisions of Citizens and Trial CourtJudges, 26
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315 (2002) (various biases in
assessment of punitive damages).

illusions-anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, inverse fallacy, and egocentric bias-would influence the decision
making of a sample of 167 federal magistrate judges. We administered a brief
questionnaire to these judges during a
general educational conference sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center.
We found that each of these cognitive
July-August 2002

LL- UA-L

illusions influenced their decision-

making processes.

Anchoring
When people make estimates (e.g.,
the fair market value of a house),
they commonly rely on the initial

value available to them (e.g., the list
price). That initial value tends to "anVolume 86,Number 1 Judicature 45

chor" their final estimates. Reliance
on an anchor can be reasonable because an anchor might convey relevant information about the actual
value. Even anchors that do not provide any useful information, however,
can affect people's numeric estimates.
For example, people asked to estimate the average daytime temperature in downtown San Francisco provided higher estimates when first
asked to determine whether the correct answer was greater or less than
the absurdly high anchor of 558 degrees Fahrenheit.5 In litigation, anchors such as statutory damage caps
and plaintiffs' attorneys' requests for
damages have been shown to influence the size of damage awards even
when they convey no information
about the extent of the plaintiff's in6
jury.
We tested for the effect of anchoring on the judges in our sample by
presenting them with the following
description of a serious personal injury suit in which only damages were
at issue:
Suppose that you are presiding over a
personal injury lawsuit that is in federal
court based on diversity jurisdiction. The
defendant is a major company in the
package delivery business. The plaintiff
was badly injured after being struck by
one of the defendant's trucks when its
brakes failed at a traffic light. Subsequent
investigations revealed that the braking
system on the truck was faulty, and that
the truck had not been properly maintained by the defendant. The plaintiff
was hospitalized for several months, and
has been in a wheelchair ever since, unable to use his legs. He had been earning
a good living as a free-lance electrician
and had built up a steady base of loyal
customers. The plaintiff has requested
damages for lost wages, hospitalization,
and pain and suffering, but has not specified an amount. Both parties have waived
their rights to ajury trial.
We asked half of the judges "how
much would you award the plaintiff
in compensatory damages?" We
asked the other half of the judges the
same question, but only after we first
asked them to rule on a motion filed
by the defendant to have the case dismissed for ostensibly failing to meet
the jurisdictional minimum in a di-

46

No anchor
Anchor

$1,249, 000
$882,000

$500,000
$288,000

versity suit ($75,000). We hypothesized that the $75,000 damage
threshold mentioned in the motion
would serve as an anchor, even
though the motion was frivolous.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we
found that first ruling on the motion
had a dramatic effect on the judges'
damage awards, as shown in Table 1.
Those judges who were asked only
to determine the damage award provided an average estimate of
$1,249,000, while those judges who
first ruled on the motion provided an
average estimate of only $882,000.
Also, three-quarters of the judges
who ruled on the anchor provided
damage award estimates that were
lower than the median award provided in the no anchor condition.
Even though the motion was baseless, it forced the judges to consider
whether the case was worth more
than $75,000. In estimating the
amount of damages to be awarded,
the judges in the anchoring condition began with $75,000 and adjusted
upward, albeit inadequately from
there.
These results are difficult to compare with other anchoring studies because we used a low anchor (most
other studies use a high one) and we
used a pre-trial motion to introduce
the anchor (most studies use a damage request by a plaintiff's lawyer).
That said, the results of our anchoring problem-providing a low anchor reduced the award by 29 percent-are similar to the results of the
one mock-jury study (by Malouff and
Schutte) that also involved the use of
a low anchor. Although the percentage reduction in mean awards by the
non-judges in that study exceeded
the one we found in judges (46 percent versus 29 percent), we found a
greater mean reduction in absolute
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$1,000,000
$882,000

$1,925,000
$1,000,000

dollars (roughly $77,000 versus
$368,000).
These results likely overstate the effect of an anchor on ajudge deciding
a real case. Our materials were necessarily brief relative to an actual case
in which ajudge would have access to
much more information, probably
including conflicting numeric estimates. Although the anchoring effect is real, other factors might alter
or diminish its impact in an actual
case.

Framing
When people make risky or uncertain decisions-such as deciding
whether to settle a case or to proceed
to trial-they tend to categorize their
decision options as potential gains or
losses from the status quo. 7 This categorization, or "framing," of decision
options influences judgment concerning the wisdom of incurring risk.
People tend to prefer certainty when
choosing between options that appear to represent gains and to prefer
risk when choosing between options
that appear to represent losses. For
example, most people believe that a
certain gain of $100 is preferable to a
50 percent chance of winning $200
but believe that a 50 percent chance
of losing $200 is preferable to a certain $100 loss.
Framing can have a profound impact on the assessment of civil law-

5. Plous, supran. 3, at 146 (citing to an unpublished study by Quattrone and colleagues).
6. See Chapman & Bornstein, The More You Ask
For the More You Get: Anchoring in PersonalInjury
Verdicts, 10 App. COG. PSYCHol. 519 (1996);
Malouff & Schutte, ShapingJurorAttitudes: Effects
of Requesting Different Damage Amounts in Personal
Injury Trials, 129 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 491 (1989);
Robbenolt & Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The bffects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23
LAw & HuM BEHAV. 353, 358-361 (1999).
7. See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and
Frames, 30 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).

suits because litigation produces a
natural frame.' In most lawsuits,
plaintiffs choose either to accept a
settlement payment from the defendant or to gamble that further litigation will produce a larger gain. Most
defendants, by contrast, choose either to make a certain settlement
payment to the plaintiff or to gamble
that further litigation will reduce the
amount they must pay. Plaintiffs, in
other words, often choose between
options that appear to represent
gains, while defendants often choose
between options that appear to represent losses. 9 Consequently, one
might expect there to be more pressure on plaintiffs to accept settlement offers than there is on defendants to make settlement
offers. Framing effects
might lead ostensibly
neutral mediators, including judges, to encourage plaintiffs to accept settlement offers
that are much lower
than the expected value
of the lawsuit.
To determine whether
judges' settlement recommendations might be
influenced by framing,
we presented each of the
judges with a hypothetical fact pattern
to evaluate:
Imagine that you are presiding over a
case in which a plaintiff has sued a defendant for $200,000 in a copyright action.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant are
mid-sized publishing companies with annual revenues of about $2.5 million per
year. They are represented by competent
attorneys who have not tried cases before
you in the past. You believe that the case

8. See Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the PsycholCAL. L. REV. 113, 129
(1996).
9. Id. But see Guthrie, FramingFrivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163
(2000) (explaining that litigants' risk preferences are reversed in frivolous or low-probability
litigation).
10. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Ap_
proach; 93 MIcn L. REV. 107, 128-142 (1994);
Rachlinski, supra n. 8, at 135-144.
11. See Fischhof, For Those Condemned to Study
the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in
Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky (eds) JUDMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY,; HEURISTICS AND BIASEs. 335,
341(1982).

ogy of Litigation, 70 So.

is a simple one, but it presents some
tough factual questions. There is no dispute as to the amount at stake, only as to
whether the defendant's actions infringed on the plaintiff's copyright. You
believe that the plaintiff has a 50 percent
chance of recovering the full $200,000
and a 50 percent chance of recovering
$0. You expect that should the parties fail
to settle, each will spend approximately
$50,000 at trial in litigation expenses. Assume that there is no chance that the losing party at trial will have to compensate
the winner for these expenses.
We then asked the judges to indicate whether they thought the parties
should settle the case. Half of the
judges reviewed the case from the
plaintiff's perspective: "You have
learned that the defendant intends

from the defendant's perspective.
The results supported this hypothesis. Among the judges evaluating
the case from the plaintiff's (gains)
perspective, 39.8 percent indicated
that they thought the plaintiff should
accept the $60,000 settlement offer,
but only 25 percent of the judges
evaluating the case from the
defendant's (losses) perspective indicated that they thought the defendant should pay the $140,000 settlement payment proposed by plaintiff.
Although the frame of the problem influenced the judge's evaluations, it had less effect on the judges
than on laypersons. The judges were
15 percentage points more inclined
to say that plaintiff rather than defendant should settle, while
other studies in which
law students and undergraduates evaluated similar materials have found
14 to 51 percentagepoint differences between subjects in the two
conditions."5

Judgments that require peoph
to assess the predictability
of past outcomes are
pervasive inthe law.

Hindsight bias

Hindsight vision is 20/
20. People overestimate
their own ability to have
predicted the past and
believe
that
others should have been
to offer to pay the plaintiff $60,000 to
able
to
predict
events better than was
settle the case. Do you believe that
1
possible.
'
Psychologists
call this tenthe plaintiff should be willing to acbias."
dency
"hindsight
cept $60,000 to settle the case?" The
Few judgments in ordinary life reother half reviewed the case from the
quire
people to assess the predictabildefendant's perspective: "You have
ity
of
past outcomes, but such judglearned that the plaintiff intends to
ments are pervasive in the law. For
offer to accept $140,000 to settle the
example, determining whether a decase. Do you believe that the defenfendant was negligent requires
dant should be willing to pay
judges
and juries to evaluate the rea$140,000 to settle the case?"
sonableness
of precautions that the
In both instances, the judges were
took against causing an
defendant
confronted with proposed settlement
accident even though they know that
offers that exceeded the expected
failed to prevent
judgment at trial by $10,000. Never- these precautions
injury. Precautions that seem reasontheless, the plaintiff seemed to be
choosing between gains, while the able to people before the fact can
defendant seemed to be choosing be- seem negligent after the fact.
To test whether judges are susceptween losses. We hypothesized that
tible
to the hindsight bias, we prethe judges evaluating this case from
each of the judges who particisented
the plaintiff's perspective would be
pated
in
our study with a
more likely to recommend settlehypothetical
fact
pattern based on an
ment than those judges looking at it
actual case:

July-August 2002
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In 1991, a state prisoner filed a pro se Section 1983 action in Federal District Court
against the Director of the Department
of Criminal Justice in his state, asserting,
among other things, that the prison had
provided him with negligent medical
treatment in violation of Section 1983.
The district court further found that the
plaintiff knew his claims were not actionable because he had made similar claims
several years earlier in a case that had
been dismissed by the court. Thus, the
district court sanctioned the plaintiff
pursuant to Rule 11, ordering him to obtain the permission of the Chief Judge in
the district before filing any more claims.
The plaintiff appealed the district court's
decision.
We randomly assigned the judges to
one of three conditions. Judges in
each condition were told that the
court of appeals had either: affirmed
the sanction; remanded the case to
the district court for imposition of a
less onerous sanction; or vacated the
sanction. We then asked all of the
judges: "In light of the facts of the
case, as described in the passage
above, which of the following possible
outcomes of the appeal was most
likely to have occurred (assume that
the three outcomes below are the only
possible ones) ?" We hypothesized that
the judges would be unable to escape
the influence of having been given
"knowledge" of the outcome when assessing which outcome was most likely
to have occurred.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the
outcome significantly influenced
judges' assessments. As shown in
Table 2,judges informed of a particular outcome were much more likely
to have identified that outcome as
the most likely to have occurred.
Overall, the sum of the percentage
of judges in each of the three conditions who selected the outcome that
they were provided as the "most likely
to have occurred" was 172 percent,
whereas it would have been 100 percent if learning the outcome had had
no effect on the judges. Thus, the
judges exhibited susceptibility to the
hindsight bias.
Prior studies have demonstrated
that the hindsight bias affects
judges' assessments of negligence
and recklessness. 12 Our study suggests that judges are also vulnerable

48

Affirmed
Remanded
Vacated

81.5
40.4
27.8

7.4
38.6
20.4

11.1
21.1
51.9

Note: Boldface numbers indicate the percentage of judges identifying the given outcome
as the most likely.

to the bias in procedural contexts,
such as judgments regarding:
whether Rule 11 sanctions should be
imposed (a motion or allegation can
seem more frivolous after a judicial
ruling denying it); and whether
counsel provided ineffective assistance (decisions a lawyer makes in
the course of representing a client
can seem less competent after an undesirable outcome is obtained).
We estimate that 24 percent of the
judges in our study made a different
choice because of the hindsight bias
(172 percent minus 100 percent divided by 3 conditions). This result is
comparable to data from mock-jury
studies." It is also comparable to the
estimate from a statistical review of
studies of the hindsight bias, which
indicated that the hindsight bias alters the decisions of 27 percent of
14
decision makers.

Inverse fallacy
When making categorical judgments, people tend to discount the
importance of background statistics,
such as the general prevalence of a
particular category. 5 In one demonstration of this phenomenon, medical doctors were asked to estimate
the likelihood that a patient who
had tested positive for a certain rare
disease actually had that disease."6
The doctors were told that the test
was 90 percent reliable and that the
prevalence of the disease in patients
such as the one in the example was
one in one thousand. Although the
actual likelihood is quite small, 80
percent of the doctors indicated
that it was more likely than not that

Judicature Volume 86, Number 1 July-August 2002

the patient had the illness. The doctors found the 90 percent reliability
statistic compelling, but discounted
the importance of the prevalence of
the disease.
Psychologists have labeled the specific decision-making problem identified by the aforementioned study as
the "inverse fallacy." 7 The inverse fallacy refers to the tendency to treat
the probability of a hypothesis given
the evidence (for example, the probability that a defendant was negligent
given that a plaintiff was injured) as
the same as, or close to, the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis (for example, the probability
that the plaintiff would be injured if
the defendant were negligent).
The inverse fallacy can affect the
evaluation of probabilistic evidence
in the courts. For example, DNA evi-

12. See Anderson, et. al., supran. 4; Viscusi, supra n. 4;Jennings et. al., "Outcome Foreseeability
and its Effects on Judicial Decisions" (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).
13. Hastie, Schkade & Payne,JurorJudgments in
Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Puntitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
597, 606 (1999) (24 percent shift); Kamin &
Rachlinski, Ex Post (Does Not Equal)Ex Ante: Deter
mining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM.
BE-AV. 89, 98 (1995) (34 percent shift); Stallard
& Worthington, Reducing the HindsightBias: Utilizing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 671, 679 (1998) (28 percent shift).
14. Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, The
Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORGANIZATION
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147, 161

(1991).
15. See Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 430 (1972).

16. Casscells, Schoenberger & Graboy, Interpretations by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory Results,
299 NEW ENG.J. MEDICINE 999 (1978).

17. See Koehler, Why DNA Likelihood Ratios
Should Account for Error(Even When A National Research Council Report Says They Should Not), 37
JURIMETRIcsJ. 425, 432 (1997).

dence in a criminal case can provide quite high. In fact, however, the acthe probability that a randomly se- tual probability that the defendant
lected DNA sample would match the was negligent is only 8.3 percent. We
DNA sample from the crime scene hypothesized that most of the judges
(and it typically states this as a tiny would commit the inverse fallacy and
number). Committing the inverse select the "76-100 percent" range.
The judges did relatively well on
fallacy would mean inferring that the
likelihood that the defendant is inno- this inverse fallacy problem: 40.9 percent is equivalent to the likelihood of cent selected the right answer by
a random match. This inference, choosing 0-25 percent; 8.8 percent
however, would be incorrect, as the indicated 26-50 percent; 10.1 percent
probability that the defendant is in- indicated 51-75 percent; and 40.3
nocent also depends on the size of percent indicated 76-100 percent. Althe population that the suspect's though more than 40 percent of the
DNA was drawn from and the reliabil- judges analyzed this problem correctly, a comparable percentage
ity of the DNA test.
To test whether judges in our study chose the 76-100 percent range, sugwould commit the inverse fallacy, we gesting that many of the judges comgave them a problem based loosely mitted the inverse fallacy.
To some extent, judges in this
on the classic English case, Byrne v.
Boadle (1863):
study might have been responding to
The plaintiff was passing by a warehouse the underlying res ipsa loquitur docowned by the defendant when he was trine that governs cases like the one
struck by a barrel, resulting in severe in- described in our question. Under the
juries. At the time, the barrel was in the facts as we describe them, the plainfinal stages of being hoisted from the tiff makes out a clear case for liability
ground and loaded into the warehouse.
The defendant's employees are not sure under the doctrine. Because the law
how the barrel broke loose and fell, but dictates that the defendant be liable
they agree that either the barrel was neg- under these circumstances, the
ligently secured or the rope was faulty. judges might have relied on the docGovernment safety inspectors conducted trine in judging probabilities. This
an investigation of the warehouse and
determined that in this warehouse: (1) possibility, in fact, highlights one of
when barrels are negligently secured, the more serious difficulties that can
there is a 90% chance that they will break arise from judicial reliance on faulty
loose; (2) when barrels are safely se- judgments, namely, that legal doccured, they break loose only 1% of the trine might be based on a mistaken
time; (3) workers negligently secure barinference process. The doctrine of
rels only 1 in 1,000 times.
res ipsa loquitur instructs judges to
We then asked the judges to assess take no account of the base-rate of
"how likely is it that the barrel that hit negligence, thereby cementing the
the plaintiff fell due to the negli- inverse fallacy into important legal
gence of one of the workers?" We precedent."
provided the judges with one of four
In any event, the judges in our
probability ranges to select: 0-25 per- study were more attentive than other
cent, 26-50 percent, 51-75 percent, or experts to base-rate statistics. As
noted above, 20 percent of a group of
76-100 percent.
When presented with a problem doctors-as compared to 40 percent
like this one, most people commit of the judges in our study-provided
the inverse fallacy and assume the a correct (or nearly correct) answer
likelihood that the defendant was to a question using nearly identical
negligent is 90 percent, or at least probabilities.

18. Kaye, ProbabilityTheory Meets Res Ipsa Loqui-

tur, 77 MICH L. REv. 1456 (1979).
19. See, e.g., Ross & Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in
Availability and Attribution, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 322 (1979) (testing for egocentric biases in joint activities).
20. 28 U.S.C. §1292(b).

Egocentric biases
People tend to make judgments about
themselves and their abilities that are
"egocentric" or "self-serving."1" People
routinely estimate, for example, that
they are above average on a variety of
July-August 2002

desirable characteristics, including
health, driving, productivity, and the
likelihood that their marriage will succeed. Moreover, people overestimate
their contribution to joint activities.
Following a conversation, for example, both parties will usually estimate that they spoke more than half
the time. Similarly, when married
couples are asked to estimate the percentage of household tasks they perform, their estimates typically add up
to far more than 100 percent.
Egocentric biases are generally psychologically healthy, but they can
have an unfortunate influence on the
litigation process. Due to egocentric
biases, litigants and their lawyers
might overestimate their own abilities, the quality of their advocacy, and
the relative merits of their cases.
These views, in turn, are likely to undermine settlement efforts, as each
side remains too optimistic about its
chances of winning at trial.
Like litigants and lawyers, judges
might also be inclined to interpret
information in self-serving or egocentric ways. Egocentric biases might
keep judges from maintaining an
awareness of their limitations, which
could work to the detriment of litigants appearing in their courtrooms.
For example, a federal judge can
grant an interlocutory appeal only if
she is willing to concede that she has
issued a ruling on a matter of law "as
to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion."2" Thus, a
litigant seeking to persuade a judge
to grant an interlocutory appeal must
convince her that another judge
could easily disagree with her ruling.
Egocentric biases may facilitate judicial self-confidence and decisiveness,
but they also might induce judges to
underestimate the likelihood they
will make mistakes when adjudicating and settling cases.
To test whether judges are prone
to egocentric biases, we asked those
participating in our study to respond
to a simple question: "United States
magistrate judges are rarely overturned on appeal, but it does occur.
If we were to rank all of the magistrate judges currently in this room according to the rate at which their de-
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Anchoring effects

Estimated damages with
and without a low anchor

No difference between
conditions

Anchor reduced awards
by 29%

Comparable

Hindsight bias

Percent identifying known
outcome as most likely
outcome

Total percent of judges
identifying known outcome
(across 3 conditions) sums

Percentage identifying
known outcome summed
to 172%

Comparable

-^

cisions have been overturned during
their careers, [what] would your rate
be?" We then asked the judges to
place themselves into the quartile
corresponding to their respective reversal rates: highest (i.e., >75 percent), second-highest (>50 percent),
third-highest (>25 percent), or lowest (lowest 25 percent).
The judges exhibited an egocentric
bias. Overall, 56.1 percent of the
judges reported that their appeal rate
placed them in the lowest quartile;
31.6 percent placed themselves in the
second-lowest quartile; 7.7 percent in
the second-highest quartile, and 4.5
percent in the highest quartile. In
other words, nearly 87.7 percent of
the judges believed that at least half of
their peers had higher reversal rates
on appeal. This pattern of results differs significantly from what one would
expect if judges were unbiased. Even
assuming that the 56.1 percent of the
judges in the lowest quartile had
never been overturned on appeal (an
unlikely possibility, but one that would
make their assessments reasonable),
the remaining distribution ofjudges is
skewed significantly towards the lower
quartiles.
The magnitude of the egocentric
bias exhibited by the judges in this
study was similar to that reported in
50

-

1t~o

other studies of the bias. Judges in
our sample were comparable to automobile drivers (87.5 percent claim to
be safer than the average driver),
slightly more modest than university
faculty (94 percent claim to be better
teachers than average), and much
more modest than couples about to
be married (99 percent claim to be
less likely than the average couple to
get divorced).21

Judges are human
Judges, it seems, are human. They
appear to fall prey to the same cognitive illusions that psychologists have
identified among lay persons and
other professionals. Table 3 summarizes our results and compares them
to the results of studies on
nonjudicial decision makers.
Although the judges in our study
were less susceptible to framing effects and the inverse fallacy than
other decision makers faced with
similar situations, they proved to be
just as susceptible as other experts
and laypersons to the influence of
anchoring effects, the hindsight bias,
and the egocentric bias.
Overall, our results indicate that,
like the rest of us, judges use heuristics
that can produce systematic errors in
judgment. Even if judges are free
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from prejudice against either litigant,
fully understand the relevant law,
know all of the relevant facts, and can
put their personal politics aside, they
might still make systematically erroneous decisions because of the way
they-like all human beings-think.
Unlike the rest of us, however,
judges' judgments can compromise
the quality of justice that the courts
deliver. In the law review article from
which this article was abstracted, we
have identified several things that
judges can do to minimize the effects
of cognitive illusions, including considering multiple perspectives and
seeking out decision-making methods or standards that are less likely to
be influenced by misleading heuristics.22 A deeper understanding of
how people think, including an appreciation of the power of heuristics,
is the first step toward crafting sound
solutions. Vi

21. See Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More
Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers? 47 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 145-146 (1981) (driving);
Cross, Not Can, But Will College Teaching Be Improved? 17 NEw DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
1, 5-6 (1977) (college professors); and Baker and
Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average:
Perceptionsand Expectations ofDivorce at the Time of
Marriage, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993) (engaged couples).
22. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. Rrv. 777 (2001).

